Other concerning issues:

♤ Years subsequent to the implementation of CPC’s recommendations become fiscally stressful for the Centre and states. For e.g. in 2009-10, the fiscal deficit exceeded 6% post-Sixth CPC’s implementation. Most recently, due to the Seventh CPC, additional pay-out accounted for nearly 0.65% of GDP in FY17.

♤ The recommendations are liable to be influenced by the biasness of its members. For e.g. in 2014, a few retired officers challenged the appointment of an IAS officer in the 7th CPC, in the Delhi High Court.

♤ Appointment, implementation or timing of the CPC can be potentially politicized and can cause disruptions.

In this context, the following changes are desirable:

♤ Development of a risk-reward-led annual compensation system.

♤ Security of tenure to employees so as to reasonably assess his/her performance. Currently, frequent transfers hamper assessment of performance.

♤ Competency and merit, and not just seniority to be the criteria for higher Central and State appointments and deputations.

♤ Adoption of annual targets and long-term plans to evaluate individual as well as Department’s performance – cues can be taken from the performance management systems deployed in the private sector.

♤ Job security, tangible and intangible perks and the net Cost-to-Government be quantified to promote transparency of information – government officials often complain about low salaries as compared to the private sector.

As suggested by the Seventh CPC chairman, AK Mathur, the practice of CPC appointment should be replaced with a mechanism of differential pay for different performances reviewed periodically, emulating the productivity and outcome based systems existent in Spain, Singapore, Germany and other nations. Also, CPCs make several recommendations regarding posting, promotions, performance review etc. which are cold shouldered. Hence, adoption of their recommendations must be all encompassing and not limited to salary and pension.