< Previous | Contents | Next >
14. Veto Over State Bills
The governor is empowered to reserve certain types of bills passed by the state legislature for the consideration of the President. The President can withhold his assent to such bills not only in the first instance but also in the second instance. Thus, the President enjoys absolute veto (and not suspensive veto) over state bills. But in US and Australia, the states are autonomous within their fields and there is no provision for any such reservation.
From the above, it is clear that the Constitution of India has deviated from the traditional federal systems like US, Switzerland and Australia and incorporated a large number of unitary or non- federal features, tilting the balance of power in favour of the Centre. This has prompted the Constitutional experts to challenge the federal character of the Indian Constitution. Thus, KC Wheare described the Constitution of India as "quasi-federal”. He remarked that "Indian Union is a unitary state with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary features.”6
According to K Santhanam, the two factors have been responsible for increasing the unitary bias (tendency of centralisation) of the Constitution. These are: (i) the dominance of the Centre in the financial sphere and the dependence of the states upon the Central grants; and (ii) the emergence of a powerful erstwhile planning commission which controlled the developmental process in the states6a. He observed: "India has practically functioned as a unitary state though the Union and the states have tried to function formally and legally as a federation.”7
However, there are other political scientists who do not agree with the above descriptions. Thus, Paul Appleby8 characterises the Indian system as "extremely federal”. Morris Jones9 termed it as a "bargaining federalism”. Ivor Jennings10 has described it as a "federation with a strong centralising tendency”. He observed that "the Indian Constitution is mainly federal with unique safeguards for enforcing national unity and growth”. Alexandrowicz11 stated that "India is a case sui generis (i.e., unique in character). Granville Austin12 called the Indian federalism as a "cooperative federalism”. He said that though the Constitution of India has created a strong Central government, it has not made the state governments weak and has not reduced them to the level of administrative agencies for the execution of policies of the Central government. He described the Indian federation as "a new kind of federation to meet India’s peculiar needs”.
On the nature of Indian Constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar made the following observation in the Constituent Assembly: "The
Constitution is a Federal Constitution in as much as it establishes a dual polity. The Union is not a league of states, united in a loose relationship, nor are the states the agencies of the Union, deriving powers from it. Both the Union and the states are created by the Constitution, both derive their respective authority from the Constitution.”13 He further observed: "Yet the Constitution avoids the tight mould of federalism and could be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circum- stances”.14 While replying to the criticism of over-centralisation in the Constitution, he stated: "A serious complaint is made on the ground that there is too much centralisation and the states have been reduced to municipalities. It is clear that this view is not only an exaggeration but is also founded on a misunderstanding of what exactly the Constitution contrives to do. As to the relations between the Centre and the states, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the Centre and the states not by any law to be made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what the Constitution does. The states are in no way dependent upon the Centre for their legislative or executive authority. The states and the Centre are coequal in this matter. It is difficult to see how such a Constitution can be called centralism. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the states have been placed under the Centre. The Centre cannot by its own will alter the boundary of this partition. Nor can the judiciary”.15
In Bommai case16 (1994), the Supreme Court laid down that the Constitution is federal and characterised federalism as its 'basic feature’. It observed: "The fact that under the scheme of our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-a-vis the states does not mean that the states are mere appendages of the Centre. The states have an independent constitutional existence. They are not satellites or agents of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, the states are supreme. The fact that during emergency and in certain other eventualities their powers are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not destructive of the essential federal feature of the Constitution. They are exceptions and the exceptions are not a rule. Let it be said that the federalism in the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative
convenience, but one of principle-the outcome of our own process and a recognition of the ground realities”.
(i) normal division of powers under which states enjoy autonom within their own spheres; and
(ii) need for national integrity and a strong Union government und exceptional circumstances.
The following trends in the working of Indian political system reflects its federal spirit: (i) Territorial disputes between states, for example, between Maharashtra and Karnataka over Belgaum; (ii) Disputes between states over sharing of river water, for example, between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over Cauvery Water; (iii) The emergence of regional parties and their coming to power in states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, etc.; (iv) The creation of new states to fulfil the regional aspirations, for example, Mizoram or Jharkhand; (v) Demand of the states for more financial grants from the Centre to meet their developmental needs; (vi) Assertion of autonomy by the states and their resistance to the interference from the Centre; (vii) Supreme Court’s imposition of several procedural limitations on the use of Article 356 (President’s Rule in the States) by the Centre.18
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, P. 43.
2. The American Constitution originally consisted only 7 Articles, the Australian 128 and the Canadian 147.
3. The various amendments carried out since 1951 have deleted about 20 Articles and one Part (VII) and added about 95 Articles, four Parts (IVA, IXA, IXB and XIVA) and four Schedules (9,10,11 and 12).
4. A majority of 2/3 of the members of each House present and voting and a majority of the total membership of each House.
5. Till 2019, the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed a special status by virtue of Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
6. K.C. Wheare: Federal Government, 1951, P. 28.
6a. In 2015, the Planning Commission was replaced by a new body called NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India).
7. K. Santhanam: Union-State Relations in India, 1960, PP. 50-70.
8. Paul Appleby: Public Administration in India, 1953, P. 51.
9. Morris Jones: The Government and Politics in India, 1960, P. 14.
10. Ivor Jennings: Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution, 1953, P. 1.
11. C.H. Alexandrowicz: Constitutional Development in India, 1957, PP. 157-70.
12. Granville Austin: The Indian Constitution–Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford, 1966, PP. 186-88.
13. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, P. 33.
14. Ibid, Vol.VII, PP. 33-34.
15. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s speech in the Constituent Assembly on 25.11.1949 reproduced in The Constitution and the Constituent Assembly; Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1990, P. 176.
16. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994).
17. Subash C. Kashyap: Our Parliament, National Book Trust, 1999 Edition, P. 40.
18. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). For the details of the judgement, see "President’s Rule” in Chapter 16.
The Constitution of India, being federal in structure, divides all powers (legislative, executive and financial) between the Centre and the states. However, there is no division of judicial
power as the Constitution has established an integrated judicial system to enforce both the Central laws as well as state laws.
Though the Centre and the states are supreme in their respective fields, the maximum harmony and coordination between them is essential for the effective operation of the federal system. Hence, the Constitution contains elaborate provisions to regulate the various dimensions of the relations between the Centre and the states.
The Centre-state relations can be studied under three heads:
• Legislative relations.
• Administrative relations.
• Financial relations.
Articles 245 to 255 in Part XI of the Constitution deal with the legislative relations between the Centre and the states. Besides these, there are some other articles dealing with the same subject.
Like any other Federal Constitution, the Indian Constitution also divides the legislative powers between the Centre and the states with respect to both the territory and the subjects of legislation. Further, the Constitution provides for the parliamentary legislation in the state field under five extraordinary situations as well as the centre’s control over state legislation in certain cases. Thus, there are four aspects in the Centre-states legislative relations, viz.,
• Territorial extent of Central and state legislation;
• Distribution of legislative subjects;
• Parliamentary legislation in the state field; and
• Centre’s control over state legislation.