Answer:

Unlike the Fundamental Right the Directive Principles contained in Articles 36-51, Part IV of the Indian constitution are not legally enforceable. Nonetheless, they have been deemed “fundamental in the Governance of the Country”. Article 37 enjoins that it is the duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws. Thus, it has been argued that the sanction behind these principles is political rather than juridical for “if any government ignore them, they will certainly have to answer for them before the electorate at the election time”, as argued by Dr Ambedkar.

It has been noted that declarations made in Part IV of the constitution are in many cases wider in import than the declarations made in Part III of the constitution i.e. the Fundamental Rights. In this context the question of priority in case of conflict between these two classes of provisions is pertinent. The DPSP have, through important constitutional amendments (25th, 42nd etc.), become the benchmark to insulate legislation enacted to achieve social objectives. The present position is that only Article 39 (b) and Article 39 (c) can be given precedence over Article 14, 19 and not all the Directive Principles.

♤ In this context, the Supreme Court first in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) case, observed, “The directive principles have to conform to and run subsidiary to the chapter on fundamental rights.”

♤ In Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973) the court observed that: “In building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be subordinated to directive principles.”

♤ In State of Kerala V/S N.M. Thomas Case (1976) the court held that the fundamental rights and DPSP are complementary, “neither part being superior to the other,”.

♤ In the Minerva Mills Case (1980) the court observed that “Fundamental rights are not an end in them but are ... means to an end”. These ends are identified by the Directive Principles.

The DPSP are seen as aids to interpret the Constitution, and more specifically to provide the basis, scope and extent of the content of a fundamental right. In this sense both have been deemed to be complementary and supplementary to each other.