A Bill under Article 3 must satisfy 2 conditions:

♤ It shall be introduced in either House of Parliament only on the recommendation of the President.

♤ If the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the Legislature of the State for expressing its views thereon. The President shall specify the period within which the State Legislature must express its views. If the views of the State Legislature are not received within the specified or extended period, the second condition stands fulfilled.

The President (or Parliament) is not bound by the views of the State Legislature and may either accept or reject them, even if the views are received in time. Further, it is not necessary to make a fresh reference to the State Legislature every time an amendment to the bill is moved and accepted in Parliament.

Article 3 empowers the Parliament to alter the territory or integrity of the states without their consent or concurrence, which differentiates the Indian Federal system with that of the traditional system. In other words, the Parliament can redraw the political map of India according to its will. Hence, the territorial integrity or continued existence of any state is not guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, India is rightly described as “an indestructible Union of destructible states”.

While in America, where the federal system is the result of a compact or agreement between independent states, it is obvious that the agreement could not be altered without the consent of states, who are party to it. That is why American Federation has been described as “an indestructible Union of indestructible States”.

In the Indian context, DD Basu argues that such liberal powers were granted to the Indian Parliament because the grouping of the Provinces under the Government of India Acts was based on historical and political reasons rather than social, cultural and linguistic divisions of the people themselves. The question of reorganising the units according to natural alignments was indeed raised at the time of making of the Constitution but, then, there was not enough time to undertake the huge task, considering the magnitude of the problem.

There are instances where the State Legislatures have passed resolution for creating new states. But constitutionally, states cannot initiate the process of creation of states etc. It has to start from the Union Council of Ministers advising the President to recommend the introduction of the Bill in the Parliament. The motion passed by Uttar Pradesh Assembly in November 2011, to divide the state into 4 parts – Poorvanchal, Paschim Pradesh, Awadh Pradesh and Bundelkhand had only suggestive value but no material significance in Constitutional terms.

The power of centre in this regard can be seen from the Telangana issue. In case of creation of the state of Telangana, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Bill, 2013 was decisively rejected by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Council. But the same did not deter the Government from going ahead with the passage of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 (Telangana) in the Parliament.

While the legal interpretation of Article 3 is clear, i.e. the views of the Andhra Pradesh Assembly had no legal effect; the formation of Telangana was solely the prerogative of the Government of India but this position should be reconsidered in the light of the evolving meaning of Indian Federalism.