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On Governors' discretionary powers

Article 163(2) gives an impression that the Governor has a wide, undefined area of discretionary powers even outside situations where the Constitution has expressly provided for it. Such an impression needs to be dispelled. The scope of discretionary powers under Article 163(2) has to be narrowly construed, effectively dispelling the apprehension, if any, that the so- called discretionary powers extends to all the functions that the Governor is empowered under the Constitution. Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his Council of Ministers. In fact, the area for the exercise of discretion is limited and even in this limited area, his choice of action should not be nor appear to be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason, activated by good faith and tempered by caution.

In respect of Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, the Governor is expected to declare that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent there from or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. He has the discretion also to return the Bill (except Money Bill) for re-consideration of the House together with the message he might convey for the purpose. If on such reconsideration the Bill is passed again, with or without amendments, the Governor is obliged to give his assent. Furthermore, it is necessary to prescribe a time limit within which the Governor should take the decision whether to grant assent or to reserve it for consideration of the President. The time limit of six months prescribed for the State Legislature to act on the President's message on a reserved Bill should be the time limit for the President also to decide on assenting or withholding of assent. The Governor accordingly should make his decision on the Bill within a maximum period of six months after submission to him.

On the question of Governor's role in appointment of Chief Minister in the case of a hung assembly there have been judicial opinions and recommendations of expert commissions in the past. Considering all those views in mind it is necessary to lay down certain clear guidelines to be followed as Constitutional conventions in this regard. These guidelines may be as follows:

1) The party or combination of parties which commands the widest support in the Legislative Assembly should be called upon to form the Government.

2) If there is a pre-poll alliance or coalition, it should be treated as one political party and if such coalition obtains a majority, the leader of such coalition shall be called by the Governor to form the Government.

3) In case no party or pre-poll coalition has a clear majority, the Governor should select the Chief Minister in the order of preference indicated below:

(a) the group of parties which had pre-poll alliance commanding the largest number.

(b) the largest single party staking a claim to form the government with the support of others.

(c) a post-electoral coalition with all partners joining the government

(d) a post-electoral alliance with some parties joining the government and the remaining including independents supporting the government from outside.

On the question of dismissal of a Chief Minister, the Governor should invariably insist on the Chief Minister proving his majority on the floor of the House for which he should prescribe a time limit.