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Military Under the British

The military was the backbone of the Company’s rule in India. Prior to the revolt of 1857, there were two separate sets of military forces under the British control, which operated in India. The first set of units, known as the Queen’s army, were the serving troops on duty in India. The other was the Company’s troops—a mixture of European regiments of Britons and Native regiments recruited locally from India but with British officers. The Queen’s army was part of Crown’s military force.

After 1857, there was a systematic reorganisation of the Army since, as Dufferin warned in December 1888, “the British should always remember the lessons which were learnt with such terrible experience 30 years ago.”

To prevent the recurrence of another revolt was the main reason behind this reorganisation. Also, the Indian Army was to be used to defend the Indian territory of the empire from other imperialist powers in the region—Russia, Germany, France, etc. The Indian branch of the army was to be used for expansion in Asia and Africa, while the British section was to be used as an army of occupation—the ultimate guarantee of British hold over India.

To begin with, domination of the European branch over the Indian branches was ensured. The commissions of 1859 and 1879 insisted on the principle of a one-third white army (as against 14% before 1857). Finally, the proportion of Europeans to Indians was carefully fixed at one to two in the Bengal Army and two to five in the Madras and Bombay Armies. Strict European monopoly over key geographical locations and departments, such as artillery, tanks and armed corps, was maintained. Even the rifles given to Indians were of an inferior quality till 1900, and Indians were not allowed in these high-tech departments till the Second World War. No Indians were allowed in the officer rank, and the highest rank an Indian could reach till 1914 was that of a subedar (only from 1918 onwards were Indians allowed in the commissioned ranks). As late as 1926, the Indian Sandhurst Committee was visualising a 50% Indianised officer cadre for 1952!

The Indian branch was reorganised on basis of the policy of balance and counterpoise or divide and rule. The 1879 Army Commission had emphasised—“Next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force comes the counterpoise of natives against natives.” An ideology of ‘martial races’ and ‘non-martial races’, which assumed that good soldiers could come only from some specific communities, developed particularly from the late 1880s, under Lord Roberts, the commander-in-chief from 1887 to 1892. It was used to justify a discriminatory recruitment policy directed towards Sikhs, Gurkhas and Pathans who had assisted in the suppression of the revolt and were relatively marginal social groups—therefore less likely to be affected by nationalism. The soldiers from Awadh, Bihar, Central India and South India who had participated in the revolt were declared to be non-martial. Moreover, caste and communal companies were introduced in all the regiments and Indian regiments were made a mixture of various socio-ethnic groups so as to balance each other. Communal, caste, tribal and regional consciousness was encouraged to check the growth of nationalist feelings among soldiers. Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, said, “I wish to have a different and rival spirit in different regiments, so that Sikh might fire into Hindu, Gorkha into either, without any scruple in case of need.” Finally, conscious efforts were made to isolate the soldiers from life and thoughts of rest of the population through measures such as preventing newspapers, journals and nationalist publications from reaching them.

On the whole, the British Indian Army remained a costly military machine.