Why British Withdrawal Seemed Imminent Now

1. The success of nationalist forces in the struggle for hegemony was fairly evident by the end of the War. Nationalism had penetrated into hitherto untouched sections and areas.

2. There was a demonstration in favour of nationalism among the bureaucracy and the loyalist sections; because the paucity of European ICS recruits and a policy of Indianisation had ended the British domination of the ICS as early as the First World War and by 1939, there existed a British-Indian parity. The long war had caused weariness and economic

worries. Now only a depleted, war-weary bureaucracy battered by the 1942 events remained.

3. The British strategy of conciliation and repression had its limitations and contradictions.

● After the Cripps’ Offer there was little left to offer for conciliation except full freedom.

● When non-violent resistance was repressed with force, the naked force behind the government stood exposed, while if the government did not clamp down on ‘sedition’ or made offers for truce, it was seen to be unable to wield authority, and its prestige suffered.

● Efforts to woo the Congress dismayed the loyalists.

This policy of an unclear mix presented a dilemma for the services, who nevertheless had to implement it. The prospect of Congress ministries coming to power in the provinces further compounded this dilemma.

4. Constitutionalism or Congress Raj had proved to be a big morale-booster and helped in deeper penetration of patriotic sentiments among the masses.

5. Demands of leniency for INA prisoners from within the Army and the revolt of the RIN ratings had raised fears that the armed forces may not be as reliable if the Congress started a 1942-type mass movement, this time aided by the provincial ministries.

6. The only alternative to an all-out repression of a mass movement was an entirely official rule which seemed impossible now because the necessary numbers and efficient officials were not available.

Views

The British Cabinet saw the growing rift between the Congress and the Muslim League as their trump card... Both Linlithgow and the Cabinet looked to the rivalry of the Congress and the League as their most useful weapon against the demands of either.

B.R. Tomlinson

Our time in India is limited and our power to control events almost gone. We have only prestige and previous momentum to trade on and these will not last long.

Lord Wavell (October 1946)

7. The government realised that a settlement was necessary for burying the ghost of a mass movement and for good future Indo-British relations.

Now the overarching aim of the British policy-makers was a graceful withdrawal, after a settlement on the modalities of the transfer of power and nature of post-imperial India- Britain relations.