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Foreign Relations

India’s foreign policy did not shift drastically on the NDA

government’s coming to power in 2014. However, a subtle

shift did develop over the years. As India’s foreign secretary, Vijay Gokhale, observed, “India has moved on from its non- aligned past. India is today an aligned state — but based on issues.”

Sushma Swaraj, one of the senior most leaders of BJP, was placed in charge of the external affairs ministry in 2014, becoming the first woman in India to hold independent charge of the ministry. However, the prime minister was always closely overviewing the sector. Not only Sushma Swaraj but also Prime Minister Modi visited several foreign states and attended international summits.

An important plank of Modi’s foreign policy was to improve relations with neighbouring countries. The government’s ‘neighbourhood diplomacy’ was successful in improving relations with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In 2015, the Indian parliament ratified a land exchange deal with Bangladesh in the matter of some enclaves, which had been initiated by the UPA government but left pending. But relations with Pakistan saw a plunge, as discussed in the previous section. With China, there were glitches but the talks between the two countries were maintained and the situation kept under control.

A major stand-off between India and China came in 2017 over Doklam. Doklam is an area of some 100 square kilometres, comprising a plateau and a valley, located at the junction between India, Bhutan, and China. The Chumbi Valley of Tibet, Bhutan’s Ha Valley and Sikkim surround it. In 2017, the Chinese tried to construct a road in the area, and Indian troops, called in by their Bhutanese counterparts, objected to it, resulting in the stand-off. Doklam is strategic for India as it is close to the Siliguri Corridor, which connects mainland India with its north-eastern region. Bilateral ties were also affected over the US$ 60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project pushed by President Xi Jinping of China to consolidate China’s influence in the world.

With the United States, relations had already been improved by the earlier governments. Modi used his decisive mandate to further the partnership with the US. He was able to get the US president, Barack Obama, to visit India and gave an impetus to bilateral relations to get that country to invest its capital and technology in India’s development effort. Modi succeeded in getting the US to sign the bilateral Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement in 2016 for facilitating logistical support, supplies, and services between the militaries of the two countries. Then, in 2018, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was signed to facilitate access to advanced defence systems.

With the advent of Donald Trump to the post of US president, the protectionist turn in US trade policies, to an extent, tempered Indo-US relations. Even so, the US remained supportive of India, and the bilateral relationship survived.

India agreed to be part of the quadrilateral involving the United States, Japan, and Australia.

Though the early steps towards a partnership with Tokyo began under the Manmohan Singh government, the relationship progressed greatly under Modi. Japan and India have become indispensable partners in the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, and this is important to the United States as well. Japanese security is, no doubt, founded in its alliance with the US, but in counterbalancing China, Japan sees in India a vital complementary partner.

The proactive nature of the NDA government’s foreign policy is to be seen in turning the ‘Look East Policy’ into ‘Act East Policy’, which envisages the need to expand the Indian influence in East and Southeast Asia.

In West Asia, India managed to maintain a balance between Palestine and Israel without preference. India succeeded in getting invited to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for the first time since its inception. India

reached out boldly to both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with the idea of gaining politically and economically. In the long term, India, fighting the threat from cross-border terrorism, was bound to gain from the Gulf monarchies’ growing opposition to Islamist terrorism.

India joined the Australia Group, which aims to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, and will ensure a more secure world. With this, India had become a member of three of the four nuclear export control regimes. Earlier, India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016 and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) in 2017. India’s membership bid for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was pending as China opposed India’s bid.

India took a leading role in the establishment of the International Solar Alliance along with France to tackle the challenge that faces the planet, global warming and climate change.

Opponents of Modi may snigger at the bear hugs and the selfies with world leaders, but beneath all that lay an astute approach to foreign relations. The Modi government “redefined strategic autonomy as an objective that is attainable through strengthened partnerships rather than the avoidance of partnerships.” The global scenario today is complex, and a country’s approach has to be flexible. So, India’s engagement with the so-called Quad enhances its strategic autonomy with regard to China, and when it confers with Russia and China for a trilateral, it enhances its strategic autonomy in relations to the Trump administration which seeks to challenge the basic tenets of the global economic order.