COMMON CONCEPTS USED IN EXPLAINING HUMAN ACTIONS
We now outline the common ethical concepts used to explain moral actions. These form the stock in trade of moral discussions, and help us in following them.
Appetites are blind drives towards particular ends. Satisfactions of appetite are often called pleasures; unsatisfied appetites are called pains. A pleasure-seeker is one who seeks thesatisfaction of his animal appetites. Some schools of philosophy such as Epicureanism in ancient Greece and Charvak in ancient India advocated pursuit of pleasure as legitimate goal of human actions. However, conduct as conceived in Ethics, has to be guided by rational considerations. Hence, appetites and impulses need to be brought under rational control.
‘Good’ is a fundamental idea in Ethics. Good is anything which men consciously desire. Nothing becomes an object of desire unless it is consciously regarded as a good. Real desire is something
considered as good, and consciously chosen as an end. Of course, men may adopt as ends objects which areonly seemingly but not really good. ‘What is good’ is a topic much discussed in philosophy.
Men often have desires which are inconsistent or conflict with one another. In the process, some desires prevail over others. The term ‘wish’ refers to those desires that prevail and are effective. In Ethics, a wish is distinguished from definite act of will. Even when possessed of will, we may not act. ‘Force of will’ is the power of carrying resolutions into actions. Will implies that we not merely wish for something, but take active steps for getting hold of it – will contains an energising element. In an act of will, we do not look upon an end as a good to be sought; we regard it as an end to be brought about by us.
The terms ‘purpose’, ‘intention’ and ‘motive’ are frequently used in explanations of human actions. An intention means any aim that is definitely adopted as an object of will. Motive means what moves men or causes them to act in a particular way. Men are sometimes moved to action by feeling or emotion. But moral judgments can be passed only on thoughtful actions or actions which aim at consciously examined ends. Moral activity or conduct is purposeful action; and action with a purpose is not simply moved by feeling: it is moved by the thought of some end to be attained. Hence, the motive or that which induces us to act is the thought of a desirable end. The motive of an act is a part, but not the whole of the intention. Men often understand what is good, but fail to pursue it. This happens because motives of human action are often partly or wholly irrational.