2.2. 1962-1991: Period of Self Help Approach

In the aftermath of the China war Nehru faced criticism at home, however there was none taller than him in the domestic politics. Thus, changes in India’s approach after the debacle also begun under him. Most importantly, India embarked on a substantial program of military modernization. It committed itself to the creation of a million-strong army with ten new mountain divisions equipped and trained for high altitude warfare, a 45-squadron air force with supersonic aircraft and a modest program of naval expansion.

Even under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, after Nehru’s demise in 1964, India still did not formally abandon the stated adherence to a policy of nonalignment. As a result, at the level of rhetoric and principle nonalignment remained a constant feature of Indian foreign policy.

India’s foreign policy behaviour, however, increasingly acquired a more realist orientation in

multiple senses.

In this phase the shaping of cold war in Asia affected India as well. Pakistan had joined the US backed security initiatives such as the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. The United States had provided arms to Pakistan as well. For a brief period of military cooperation with India in the aftermath of the 1962 war, the United States disengaged itself from South Asia after the second India-Pakistan conflict in 1965 as it became increasingly preoccupied with the prosecution of the Vietnam War. During the 1965 war the US suspended military aid to both the countries. With this American disengagement from the subcontinent, Pakistan sought to expand the scope of its security cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to balance Indian power. This contributed to a growing security nexus between India’s two major adversaries.

On the other hand facing difficulties in its relations with PRC and sensing an opportunity to expand its influence in the subcontinent, the USSR mediated the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan in 1966.

In this phase, except for the pressure for tempering criticism on the Vietnam War, agricultural policy and opening up of markets under the Johnson administration in 1966, the US mostly remained oblivious to India’s concerns.