MORAL THINKERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Introduction

Moral philosophy took a different turn in the twentieth century. Many philosophers gave up the earlierprevalent practice of prescribing or espousingparticular moralsystems.Instead,theytended to subject prevailing moral theories to close epistemological scrutiny. From this angle, they raised questions about the logical foundations of moral theories. What are the categories or concepts used in moral theories? What are the meanings commonly attached to such moral terms? What is the logical status of statements or propositions used in moral philosophy? Can moral arguments be accorded logical status? Their approach can be described as ‘discussions about moral discussions’. This approach is known as meta-ethics. In this process, the normative has tended to recede to the background.

G. E. Moore

Ideal Utilitarianism

Inhisfamouswork,PrincipiaEthica,Moorepropoundedthreedoctrines:ideal utilitarianism;naturalistic fallacy;and moralintuition.Mooresaysthat utilitarian moral standardcanconnect ethics to human conduct. When raising the practical question “What ought I to do?” one must always base his decision on whether the action will be the cause of the good or bring about good effect. From this it follows “that ‘right’ does and can mean nothing but ‘cause of a good result,’ and is thus identical with ‘useful.’” The final determination of the useful (i.e., the good) was, as we shall see, for Moore a kind of intuition. It is through intuitionthat one ‘sees’ the intrinsic value of morallypractical actions. Moore also identifies three types of desirable conduct. These consist of impersonal aesthetic and intellectual avocations; warm human friendships; and benevolent actions towards others. Some writers criticized Moore of ignoring class divisions, social conflicts, and thinking only about a small group of well off intellectuals.

Intuitive Perception of Goodness

Moorealso discusses the nature and status of ‘goodness’,the chief moral trait. He says that it should not be mixed up or confused with natural properties of things. It is unanalyzable and indefinable. He gives an example of yellow light. In physics, it is identified with a particular wavelength of light. But we perceive yellowness as a quality directly without the paraphernalia of scientific terminology. Similarly, we also perceive goodness directly or intuitively. For Moore, goodness is a matter of intuitive moral perception. Aa a consequence of this, for Moore ‘good’ is a simple notion; just as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion. ‘Good’ is not to be defined in terms of anything outside itself, but this does not make it impossible to grasp, any more than the colour yellow.

Naturalistic Fallacy

Moore’s phrase “naturalistic fallacy” became very popular. The naturalistic fallacy consists in identifying goodness (or other moral qualities) with natural properties of things. For instance, identifying the good with the pleasurable involves a naturalistic fallacy. Moore argues that in fact no description of natural properties ever logically commits one to an ethical judgment. Thus, even

if it is true that “X is pleasurable” (or that it is a naturalistic statement), one can always ask, “but is it good?”Its goodness does not logically follow.Thus naturalisticfallacyleads to logicallyinadmissible procedures.

Sir David Ross

Sir David Ross’s ideas are propounded in his book The Right and the Good. Ross’s ideas are largely a response to the type of utilitarianism found in Moore’s Principia Ethica. Moore says that “right means productive of the highest good.” For Ross, what makes a right act right is not the principle of utility but an overriding moral duty that might sometimes conflict with Moore’s “ideal utilitarianism”. Moore,for instance, says “in effect,that theonly morally significant relation in which my neighbours stand to me is that of being possible beneficiaries by my action.” This leads at times to breaking other important moral principles. Suppose a group of young men become lazy, and begin to live on charity, though they can earn a living thorough manual labour. A charitable person helps them to continue living in their indolent way. His generosity is misplaced and tends to displace the virtue of self reliance in the young men.

Prima facie Duties

Ross holds that moral agents have certain duties that are not based upon the consequences of their adoption,but on the rightness of their adoption.Thisis, of coursethedifference between approaches based on consequences of action (as in utilitarianism) and the inherent moral worth of an action (as in deontology). Ross calls such general principles prima facie duties in light of the fact that, “all things being equal” i.e., no other opposing circumstances present, we ought to follow the principle. For example, all things being equal, we ought to keep promises.

Conflict between Duties

But moral situations can be complex with a conflict of prima facie duties. On this account, Ross holds that in such situations the actual duty of moral agents will be that which is right for the particular situation. For instance, while keeping promises is a prima facie duty, in certain situations, it is outweighed by another prima facie duty. Ross uses the example of breaking a trivial promise of meeting a friend in order to prevent a serious accident. He writes in this connection:

“. . . besides the duty of fulfilling promises I have and recognise aduty of relievingdistress, and that when I think it right to do thelatter at the cost of not doingthe former, it isnot because I think I shallproduce more goodtherebybut because I think it the duty which is in the circumstancesmore of aduty.”

In this case the latter duty is our actual duty, though both prima facie duties maintain their deontological nature. Ross’s explanation of ‘right action’ removes the emphasis on “utility” in Moore’s ethics. It emphasises the notion of a moral agent’s duty to do the right thing.

The views of Moore and Ross reflect the spirit of the classical debates between the utilitarians and the Kantians. Moore prefers a notion of action based upon the consequences of bringing more good than evil into the world. Ross proposes a conception of action based upon the morally good person’s fulfilment of his sense of duty in light of what is ethically right. As we shall see, the ideas of Ross are of particular importance in questions involving ethical dilemmas.

A.J. Ayer

Strictly speaking, A.J. Ayer is not a moral thinker. He belongs to a philosophical school called logical positivism. The main aim of logical positivists is to remove metaphysical speculations from philosophy. They proposed a criterion of truth which permits only certain categories of statements into philosophy. This view has important implications for moral discussions.

Types of propositions

For understanding these ideas, we need a brief background of ‘proposition’ as it is understood in logic and philosophy. Proposition is any statement which is either true or false. It cannot be both, for that will involve a contradiction – a cardinal sin in logic. The same proposition can be expressed in different verbal forms as different sentences with the same meaning.

The types of propositions are shown in the following table:

According to Ayer, only the first three types of statements are meaningful. Ayer propounded the criterion of truth as verification: that the meaning of a statement is the manner of its verification. What it means simply is that if there are no means of checking a statement’s truth in practice or in principle, it should not be treated as a proposition. Logical and mathematical statements (analytic statements) are meaningful since they express the necessary truths of logic and mathematics derived through proofs.

Moral Emotivism

Ayer says that ethical statements as also statements of metaphysics, theology and many literary expressions are ‘meaningless’. It means that they have no status as propositions or they are pseudo- propositions. As regardsthe status of ethical statements,Ayer says that they are merelyexpressions of emotions. Hence, this doctrine is known as emotivism.

Ayer expounds his ideas in Language, Truth and Logic. It is written in a clear, lucid and elegant style. Even general readers can easily read and understand it with a little effort. However, the book contains no substantial discussion on ethics. The question which Ayer raises is epistemological or concerns theory of knowledge: what kind of propositions can be considered part of philosophy?

C.L. Stevenson

Nature of Ethical Judgements

Stevenson worked out in greater detail the implications of emotive theory of ethics. He develops emotivism into a theory of ethical language according to which moral judgments do not state any

sort of fact, but rather express the moral emotions of the speaker and attempt to influence others. When anyone says that something is good or bad, or right or wrong, it seems on the face of it, that he is describing, attributing to the thing some property, that is goodness or badness, or rightness or wrongness. But according to Stevenson moral judgments do not describe at all. In other words, they are not about facts. Uttering moral sentences has a different function: to express emotions, and to influence or invite others to share them. “Moral judgments are concerned with recommending something for approval or disapproval; and this involves something more than a disinterested description.”

People often pass moral judgments that something is good or bad. Such statements simply reflect whether they like or dislike that thing. The purpose of such statements is to persuade the audience to adopt the attitude of the speaker. Moral expressions are, due to their strong emotive content, particularly well suited for such persuasion.

Stevenson here argues that moral judgments are simply a cover for the attempts which people make to persuade one other into adopting a particular normative attitude. For example, saying “dowry taking is wrong,” is just a very strong way of stating that the speaker disapproves of dowry taking. The purpose of the statement is to evoke similar disapproval from others. It thereby attempts to influence the future conduct of both speakers and listeners.

Persuasive Definition

Stevenson introduced the phrase “persuasive definition” which has become very popular. It refers to a situation often found in ethical argumentation. It involves use of expressions that have two particular characteristics:

(i) having emotive overtones/meanings (positive or negative)

(ii) being vague in their descriptive content

Some examples of such terms are democracy, freedom, repression and terrorism. In discussions, one party gives a positive spin to the ‘definition’ of his cause, and a negative one to the opponent’s. The persuasive definitionuses theinherent vagueness of a term, which gives room for many possible definitions, facilitating clever use of emotively charged expressions. Thus terrorism may be described as heinous by one side and as legitimate response to intolerable oppression by the other.

Stevenson extends the distinction between facts and values (ethical norms) into ethics as a distinction between beliefs and attitudes. Beliefs belong to the realm of facts. Attitudes refer to the psychological states of approval or disapproval. Attitude can never, in principle, be reducible to a “disinterested description.” Our attitudes are neither true nor false but simply beyond the sphere of facts.

Ayer and Stevenson belong to the twentieth century Anglo-American positivistic tradition. Positivism refuses to engage in moral discussions. It makes no moral assumptions; nor does it pass moral judgments on things, individuals, social situations or social institutions. It aims at dispassionate factual analysis. It strictly follows the distinction between facts and values. We now look at moral philosophers who tried to get over the distinction between facts and values.

R.M. Hare

Prescriptivism

R. M. Hare’s moral theory is known as prescriptivism. Hare first presented his theory in The Language of Morals. Hare rejected the prevailing theory of emotivism, which maintained that moral statements are merely expressions of individual preference. For Hare, moral statements are prescriptions or guides to conduct. They are universalizable i.e. they apply to everyone.

Suppose I am prescribing, for myself and others, the command of, for instance, not harming others. That type of prescription demands my acting in accordance with it. First, the very language of morals involves a commitment to conduct. Secondly, our reasoning about the ethical situation contains the principle of universality.

The universal applicability of moral judgments can be illustrated in the following example. Consider the judgment, “A ought to do X to B and C”. When universalized, it also implies the judgments

“B ought to do X to A and C” and “C ought to do X to A and B”

Irrespective of who the benefactors and beneficiaries are, the moral judgment will still apply. Or one must accept the moral judgment irrespective of what one’s individual preferences are i.e. whether one is A rather than B or C.

According to Hare, natural language has a particular logical aspect. It generallyexpresses moral judgments using the term “ought” or by saying what is “right”. Such moral judgments are binding on all people and have overriding force.

Hare avoids broader metaphysical or epistemological considerations. Such considerationslead moral discussions astray. As we have notedearlier,(forexample with Ayer and Stevenson) reasoning about ethics has become an investigation into ethical reasoning. There is virtually no moral content in such discussions.

Form of Moral Arguments

We will now give a simple version of Hare’s conception of a moral argument. As we noted before, some philosophers reject the very possibility of moral arguments. According to Hare, if the premises contain moral terms along with factual statements, a valid argument will result.

The basic form of the argument is shown below.

All animals in distress ought to be helped. This dog is in distress.

This dog should be helped.

The main point to note is that moral arguments are not irrational but fall within reasonable discourse.

Two-level utilitarianism

Hare argues that human beings, depending on their intellectual endowments, rely on their intuitive moral beliefs or on critical thinking. In either case, the fundamental human moral beliefs are the same. But men differ in their critical reasoning abilities and in their ability to recognise the moral

components of a situation and reaching the appropriate moral judgments. In other words, while making moral judgments,some people followtheir moral intuitions, and others rely on their reason. This leads Hare to the conception of two-level utilitarianism. Intuitive level of thinking implies that moral decisions are based on rule utilitarianism. People use prima facie principles which apply to common, general types of situations or occurrences. People follow this approach when there is

no time for critical thinking or when they do not trust their critical faculties.

Critical level thinking implies act utilitarianism. Here, an individual analyses the likely consequences of an individual action, and considers whether on balance they will be good or bad. Act utilitarianism comes into play i) in unusual cases; ii) when prima facie principles are in conflict;

iii) when it is clear that utility can be maximised by adopting a particular course and one is sure that it is in fact so.

In conclusion, we may note that Hare regards ethical expressions as meaningful. He shows that there can be reasoned discussions about morals. He believes that the language of morals is prescriptive and provides universalizable imperatives applicable to particular circumstances.

John Rawls

Unlike analytical philosophers, contemporary thinkers discuss moral questions. John Rawls is one such philosopher. His book A Theory of Justice has strongly influenced thinkers in moral philosophy and public administration. We will have occasion to mention John Rawls also while discussing administrative ethics.

JohnRawlsdoes not discuss general ethics,but examines a particular species of ethics, namely, justice. He presents a highly theoretical and complicated argument about general principles which can form the basis of a just society. We cannot enter into the details of his intricate argument. We will consider it briefly in its essentials. It is a variant of the old social contract theory.

John Rawls argues that the adoption of two fundamental principles of justice would guarantee a just and morally acceptable society:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

(i) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and

(ii) attached to officesand positionsopen to all under conditions of fairequality of opportunity

The first principle ensures civil liberties to all principle 2 (i) is similar to what is called ‘positive discrimination’. It means that while unequal treatment of individuals is generally undesirable, it is justified for helping those people who suffer from disabilities which are not of their making. This view is the basis of arguments for social and economic justice. Other than this exception, social arrangements have to be based on equality of opportunity.

Rawls tries to show (by imaging a hypothetical situation) how such principles would be universally adopted, and in this way, moves partly towards general ethical issues. He starts with a social tabula rasa or a clean state preceding the origin of social arrangements. He envisages how people would derive their preferences in such situation.

He introduces a theoretical “veil of ignorance”. It ensures that all the “players” in the social game would be placed in a particular situation. Rawls calls it the “original position.” In this position, everyone only has a general knowledge about the facts of “life and society”. Therefore, each player is to make a “rationally prudential choice” concerning the kind of social institution they would enter into contract with. As the players have no specific information about themselves, they cannot adopt a partisan or self regarding view. They are forced to adopt a generalized point of view that bears a strong resemblance to the moral point of view.

“Moral conclusions can be reached without abandoning the prudential standpoint and positing a moral outlook merely by pursuing one’s own prudential reasoning under certain procedural bargaining and knowledge constraints.” This view of Rawls represents “rational choice within a veil of ignorance”. Rawls argues that given his assumptions people would prefer liberal societies with freedoms and liberties based on equality of opportunities, but with due allowance to the problems of various disadvantaged groups.

This is an appropriate point to close our discussion on major twentieth century moral thinkers. We considered the main trends of their thought. There are other thinkers, but any discussions of them will take us beyond the scope of our topic. As we saw, till about sixties, barring a few, philosophers adopted a positivistic approach. They analysed moral concepts and provided little moral guidance for practical situations of life. Their work has no normative content. This approach is hardly relevant to practicing administrators who need to be committed to certain moral values. They cannot simply assume the role of moral analysts. This does not mean that we can ignore twentieth century moral thinking. It has illuminated many moral concepts and moral arguments. This knowledge can help in analysing the moral dimensions of many practical administrative situations.