RESPONSIBILITY OF MORAL AGENTS

Our preceding discussion focused on three factors which determine the morality of actions. It presupposed that the moral agents are responsible for the actions. They have carried out the acts. Men are responsible for their actions when they act out of their freewill, with knowledge of what they are doing and with intent of performing the action. They are the ones acting and doing things.

The effects of the action are attributed to one who physically performs the action. He is directly responsible for the action. Of course, one may cause an action to be performed through others – or commission the job – instead of directly undertaking it. Even then he is responsible for the consequences of the action to the extent he has foreseen them. He has a direct moral responsibility for such consequences. We will become responsible for the consequences of actions of others if we encourage, help and persuade them or if we remain silent when we could have advised them.

In administrative situations, officials often commit errors of commission and errors of omission. Error of commission means that one has committed an offence or wrongful act. He has been an active agent. The famous line from Macbeth, “The deed is done” refers to active commission of crime. Errors of omission are situations when people fail to perform their duty or what they are supposed to do in a particular role. If a father neglects his children but does not otherwise ill treat them, he is still guilty of not performing his duty as a parent. If a police officer happens to see a crime being committed but takes no action, he is guilty of an act of omission. Administrators generally try to avoid getting into messy situations or skirt decisions for which they may later be targeted or ‘hauled over coals’. But if the matters or issues fall within their official domain, they have no option but to act in their best judgement. Otherwise, they will be guilty of dereliction of duty. They have to bite the bullet in such instances.

Many writers discuss the question about when a moral agent incurs responsibility for bad actions. They will, of course, be responsible if they had knowledge of the likely ill effects of the action. The standard applied is in fact more rigorous. Even if the moral agent has a vague inkling of the likely evil consequences of his action, he will be responsible. When a driver under influence of alcohol drives speedily along a crowded street, he will be liable if an accident takes place. Even if a sober person drives fast in such circumstances, he will be responsible for any accident.

But a good effect is attributed to only one who performs a good deed – not to others. Suppose that after a natural calamity, a government official organises a meeting and seeks donations for chief minister’s relief fund. Many people make contributions. The credit goes not to the official who organised the meeting but to the donors.