Moral relativism can be stated in two forms: moral subjectivism and cultural relativism. Moral subjectivism argues that in the sphere of human behaviour what is true for one individual is not true for everyone else or even for anyone else. In this view, right and wrong is a matter of personal opinion. There is no way in which we can evaluate the views on moral questions held by people. If X says that same sex marriage is abhorrent and Y says that it is eminently desirable, there is no way of settling the dispute. It is morally unacceptable to X and morally acceptable for Y. There are no objective criteria to which we can appeal for settling the dispute.
Refutations of moral subjectivism
Moral subjectivism reduces morality to individual opinion and is at odds with commonsense ideas. There are two ways in which it can be refuted. First, it is self refuting. Secondly, people cannot hold on to this view all the time.
The first objection looks at the logical status of moral subjectivism and points out that it is self contradictory. Suppose I assert that all moral judgements are personal opinions. This assertion can be considered from two sides. It may be treated just as my personal opinion. Then it fails to establish what I assert – it is no more than my opinion.
We may alternatively treat the statement as a valid judgement about moral truths. The implication then follows that there is at least one objective judgement about moral truths. This objective judgement is that ‘there are no objective moral truths’. This implication contradicts the position of the moral subjectivist.
That cannot always be a moral subjectivist can be easily shown by referring to an example. We take it from Doug Erlandson’s Ethics: A Jargon Free Guide for Beginners. Bertrand Russell, a famous British philosopher, argues in his book Religion and Science in favour of subjectivity of values or that moral judgements are matters of personal taste and preference. They are not objectively true or false just like one’s statement about oysters as a food item. A little later he makes two further statements. One is that “hell, as a place of punishment for sinners, becomes quite irrational.” The other is that, “it is the business of wise institutions to create harmony [between our interests and the interests of society] as far as possible.”
How is Russell being inconsistent in his moral subjectivism? He does not say that in his personal view hell is irrational or that institutions which produce harmony are wise. He states what he believes as though he were stating objective truths. He wants readers to consider them in that light. It is impossible to continuously and unfailingly adopt moral subjectivism in human life or in academic discourse.